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BY MINOR MYERS'
ABSTRACT
Giving shareholders more managerial power over corporate
affairs-the goal of many recent corporate reform proposals-comes
with costs that commentators have failed to recognize. In general, the
more involved shareholders are in a firm's managerial decisions, the
more dfficult it is for directors to be held accountable for the outcome of
those decisions. This can weaken directors' ex ante incentives to act in
the interests of shareholders. This Article argues that this phenomenon
may undermine the ambitions of the recent high-profile corporate reform
requiring each public company to hold periodic, nonbinding shareholder
votes on its executive compensation.
Supporters of the reform, known as "say on pay," predict that
corporate directors will be fearful of shareholder "no" votes because
they will attract embarrassing attention to directors and the firm. In
other words, shareholder voting will amplify the "outrage constraint"-
the threat ofshame or embarrassment in the media that, according to the
influential managerial power model of executive compensation, limits
directors' ability to award pay packages that are too big and not
sensitive enough to performance. To avoid the amplified outrage
associated with a "no" vote, directors will be compelled to modify
executive pay in ways amenable to shareholders.
Shareholder voting on executive compensation, however, could
hurt shareholders in ways supporters of the reform have overlooked.
Once shareholders have approved a firm's compensation arrangements,
directors will no longer bear complete responsibility for them. If any
negative attention-any outrage-is directed at the firm's pay practices
in the future, directors can escape a portion of the blame that otherwise
would have been theirs alone. This diffusion of responsibility will
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partially insulate directors' reputations from future outrage, and because
directors will no longer bear all of the future costs of taking risks in the
CEO's favor, they may end up taking more of those risks.
By clouding the functioning of the outrage constraint, shareholder
approval thus may liberate directors at some firms to offer executive pay
packages that are larger and more insensitive to performance than if the
board were acting alone. In view of this effect, giving shareholders a say
on executive pay may injure as many firms as it helps. To eliminate this
overbreadth problem, this Article proposes amending the legislation to
allow firms to opt-out of the say on pay regime by shareholder vote. This
preserves the benefits of say on pay for those firms where shareholders
wish to retain it and allows other firms to exit the regime at little cost.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The object of many recent reform proposals in corporate law is to
give shareholders more managerial power over corporate affairs.' But
these reforms come with costs that commentators fail to recognize. In
general, the more involved shareholders are in corporate decisions, the
more difficult it is for directors to be held accountable for the outcome of
all corporate decisions, thereby weakening directors' incentives to act in
the interests of shareholders. This Article argues that this phenomenon
may undermine the ambitions of the recent high-profile corporate reform
that gives shareholders the power to vote on executive compensation.
After the 2010 Dodd-Frank reform legislation, every public
company must now hold periodic, nonbinding shareholder votes on its
executive compensation.' Supporters of this reform predict that corporate
directors will be fearful of shareholder "no" votes because they will
attract embarrassing attention to both directors and the firm.4 In other
'E.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005).
2Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
31d.
4See Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R. 1257, The
20 11] 4 19
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words, shareholder voting will amplify the "outrage constraint"'- the
potential for shame and embarrassment in the media, which according to
many observers constitutes the operative constraint on directors' ability
to offer pay packages that are too high and not sensitive enough to
performance.' Shareholder voting on executive compensation aims to
help direct outrage at directors who deserve it, compelling them to
modify executive pay in ways amenable to shareholders.'
This reform, known as "say on pay," has plenty of detractors, and
the lines of attack are numerous. Criticisms of say on pay include: there
is no underlying problem with public company compensation;' it will
muddle the very useful boundary between board and shareholder
authority;' it will give unions and other interest groups too much
influence;" and it will overly homogenize pay practices." But suppose
those criticisms are overcome. How will say on pay affect public
company compensation? This Article questions the assumption of many
supporters that voting on compensation offers a set of discrete benefits to
shareholders with no countervailing costs." Instead, it predicts a
counterintuitive effect of the reform that calls into question its net
Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Serv., I l0th Cong. 110-10 at 14 (2007), [hereinafter Hearing on HR. 1257] (statement of
Stephen M. Davis, Fellow, Yale School of Management, the Millstein Center for Corporate
Governance and Performance) (discussing how shareholders and directors have more dialogue
to make sure they are on the same page regarding compensation).
5LuCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 65 (2004).
61d. at 5.
7See Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REv. 299, 345 (2009) (discussing how say on
pay is simply advisory, but still puts the directors on notice that shareholders can voice their
dissatisfaction).
8Hearing on HR. 1257, supra note 4, at 17 (statement of Steven N. Kaplan, Neubauer
Family Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business) ("[T]he current system is not broken. The bill doesn't have appreciable benefits
relative to the current system.").
9Stephen M. Bainbridge, Remarks on Say on Pay: An Unjustified Incursion on
Director Authority 8 (UCLA Sch. L. Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 08-06, March 4, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1101688.
T0Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Say on Pay": Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the
Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 351 (2009) ("The most active
institutional investors have historically been public pension funds and union pension funds,
which may have other motives in addition to shareholder-value economic considerations.").
"Id. at 325 (say on pay will "likely lead to a narrow range of approaches to the
inherently difficult problem of executive compensation . . . .").
12Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 18 (statement of Nell Minow, Editor, The
Corporate Library) ("The only objection that I have really heard ... is that the shareholders are
too stupid to make good use of the information.").
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benefits. Throughout the analysis, this Article assumes the correctness of
the managerial power model of executive compensation that finds fault
in current pay practices and provides the theoretical foundation for the
say on pay reform."
After shareholders have voted to approve a firm's compensation
arrangements, directors will no longer bear complete responsibility for
those arrangements in the mind of the public. If any negative attention-
any "outrage"' 4-is directed at the firm's compensation in the future,
directors can share at least a part of the blame with the shareholders.
Thus, approval by shareholders can partially protect directors against
future risks to their reputations." Directors will have diminished
exposure to future outrage and thus will no longer bear all of the costs of
taking risks in the CEO's favor. As a consequence, they have less
incentive to avoid those risks.'" By clouding the functioning of the
outrage constraint, shareholder approval may liberate directors to offer
executive pay packages that are larger and less sensitive to performance
than the baseline scenario of the board acting alone. This offers a
powerful explanation for why some firms voluntarily adopted
shareholder advisory voting plans well before Congress required it."
Directors, of course, can obtain this reputational insulation only by
securing shareholder approval, which may mean modifying
compensation plans to meet the shareholders' demands." These
modifications form the basis of supporters' hopes for the bill." At some
firms, the modifications necessary could be large enough to benefit
shareholders on balance. But for many firms there are ample reasons to
doubt that shareholders will be able to insist on modifications large
enough to offset the costs of the insulation. One serious and
"See infra Part II.A.2.
14BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 65.
15This "clarity of responsibility" problem is well-documented in political science. See
infra Part III.C.
1See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237, 238
(1996) (describing moral hazard as a way to deflect the consequences of bad behaviors, which
in turn encourages it).
"See Gordon, supra note 10, at 339-40.
See Hearing on HR. 1257, supra note 4, at 15 (statement of Stephen M. Davis,
Fellow, Yale School of Management, the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and
Performance) (describing how the U.K. boards, which currently have advisory votes on
compensation, now need to persuade shareholders instead of other board members in regard to
executive compensation).
See id
2011] 421
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unrecognized problem is how shareholders are expected to evaluate
company pay.20 Shareholders will vote on the compensation information
disclosed in the company's SEC filings, but at the time of disclosure it is
not clear which compensation practices are excessive and worthy of
outrage. The example of Michael Ovitz illustrates the problem.2 Ovitz,
the deposed heir-apparent at Walt Disney Co., is regularly held out as an
example of outrageous compensation. But at the time of his hiring,
which was regarded as almost miraculous for Disney, Ovitz's
compensation-while notably large-was not regarded as problematic.22
Shareholders could be asked regularly to vote on-and legitimize-a
compensation scheme before they can know whether it is outrageous in
relation to the executive's future performance.23 Additional problems can
complicate shareholder voting. First, the presence of competitors not
subject to say on pay (private U.S. firms or non-U.S. firms) might
prevent shareholders from pressing for concessions too strenuously for
fear of harming their own investment. Furthermore, boards might exploit
other business developments-a merger, a health event for a current
executive, or some threat to the competitive position of the corporation-
so that shareholders are asked to approve questionable compensation
plans at a time when they are reluctant to create new problems for the
company.
Shareholder voting on executive compensation may thus aggravate
the problem it was designed to solve. To be sure, say on pay could
tighten the relationship between pay and performance at one set of firms,
but it could just as easily aggravate that relationship at other firms, where
little must be modified to secure shareholder approval. The way to
rectify this problem of overbreadth is to amend the legislation in a way
that allows firms to opt-out of the say on pay regime by shareholder vote.
This preserves the shareholder advisory voting regime for those firms
that expect to benefit from it and allows other firms to exit from it at
little cost.
Part II outlines the critique of current executive compensation
practices and how supporters of say on pay believe it will ameliorate the
20See Gordon, supra note 10 at 340.
21See In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig, 825 A.2d 275, 279-81 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(outlining the decision to hire Ovitz as an executive and the enormous compensation package
given to him).
22James Bates, Ovitz's Contract with Disney Gets Him a Cool Million, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1995, at DI (quoting compensation consultant Graef Crystal, who advised Disney on
the Ovitz's compensation, that "[b]y Hollywood standards, this is a yawn.").
23See infra Part III.D. 1.
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problem identified by a set of commentators. Part III argues that
shareholder voting on compensation can function as reputational
insulation for directors and develops the implications of that insulation
scheme. Part IV explains why shareholders will not be able to eliminate
bad pay practices through advisory voting. Finally, Part V argues that
the benefits shareholders see from modified executive compensation
arrangements may be limited to a discrete set of firms and makes the
case for an opt-out alternative.
II. THE PROBLEM OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE PROMISE OF
SHAREHOLDER VOTING
This part describes the leading critique of executive compensation
as well as the structure and ambition of the shareholder advisory voting
regime recently passed by Congress.
A. The Debate Over Executive Compensation
A corporation's Board of Directors has the legal authority to set the
compensation of the CEO and other executives.24 The universal
corporate practice is for the board to delegate that authority to a standing
board compensation committee of independent directors." Thus,
executive compensation is the product of negotiations between the
executive and the independent directors on the compensation committee.
Because of the deference courts afford to decisions of an
independent compensation committee,26 commentators agree that the
24DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5) (2006) ("Every corporation created under this
chapter shall have the power to . . . [a]ppoint such officers and agents as the business of the
corporation requires and to pay or otherwise provide for them suitable compensation."); see
Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. Ch. 1974) ("The authority to compensate
corporate officers is normally vested in the board of directors and the compensating of
corporate officers is usually a matter of contract.") (citations omitted).
25Valeant Pharm. Int'l. v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 745-46 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("To avoid
this high level of judicial scrutiny, an independent compensation committee can be employed
to award salaries and bonuses to officers."). Stock exchange rules require that executive
compensation be set by independent directors at most companies. NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(a) (2005) (amended 2009); NASDAQ
MANUAL § 5605(d) (2009) (amended 2010). After Dodd-Frank, all public companies must
have fully independent compensation committees. Dodd-Frank § 952.
26The decisions of a compensation committee are effectively unreviewable. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1); see also In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig., 919
A.2d 563, 591 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("A committee of independent directors enjoys the presumption
20 11l] 423
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operative limits on executive compensation are not legal.27 The chief
dispute in the literature is whether market forces drive compensation
decisions or whether the market fails and other forces explain pay
decisions.28
1. The Arm's-Length View of Current Practice
In the view of some observers, the independence of compensation
committees allows them to negotiate at something close to arm's-length
with executives,29 and the market for managerial talent largely sets the
terms of negotiation." Proponents of this view argue that the pay of
CEOs is, in fact, correlated with performance," and rising pay for CEOs
and other executives is simply a function of the growing demand for their
services." In this line of analysis, one explanation for any divergence
between pay and performance is the potential for anger over high
absolute levels of compensation." Kevin Murphy and Michael Jensen
hypothesize that political pressure-from both inside and outside firms-
can cause directors to avoid pay packages capable of providing large
payoffs for extraordinary performance.
that its actions are prima facie protected by the business judgment rule."); Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) ("[D]irectors' decisions will be respected by courts unless
the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision. . . .").
27E.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Disney Verdict Shuts Out Investors, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2005 ("[flnvestors cannot look to judicially imposed liability for protection from disastrous
compensation decisions and other governance failures.").
28See Simmons, supra note 7, at 304-05.
29Steven N. Kaplan, Are US. CEOs Overpaid?, 22 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSP., May
2008, at 10 ("[The preponderance of the evidence points toward market forces as the driver of
high CEO pay.").30Kevin J. Murphy & JAn ZAbojnik, Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs 4-5
(April 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid-984376 (noting that recent CEO pay increases are "consistent with
competition" in the market for managerial talent).
3
'Kaplan, supra note 29, at 14 ("There can be no doubt that the typical CEO in the
United States is paid for performance.").
32Murphy & ZAbojnik, supra note 30, at 31.
33Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 4 (remarks of Rep. David Scott (D-GA))
(expressing outrage over the large disparity between the average worker and a CEO).
34Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 225, 262 (1990) ("[P]olitical forces ... limit large payoffs for
exceptional performance. Truncating the upper tail of the payoff distribution requires that the
lower tail of the distribution also be truncated in order to maintain levels of compensation
consistent with equilibrium in the managerial labor market.").
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2. The Managerial Power View of Current Practice
In the view of other observers, the system of setting executive
compensation is fundamentally broken." The most influential critique
has come from Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, who have developed a
model of executive compensation centered on managerial power. They
contend that it is naive to assume that compensation committees bargain
at arm's-length with CEOs. " The constraint on CEO pay packages is not
market forces but the threat of negative attention from the media or
shareholders, or "outrage."" Understanding this model, particularly the
role of outrage in it, is crucial to understanding how shareholder advisory
voting on executive compensation is supposed to affect compensation
practices at public companies.
At the center of the managerial power model is the claim that
CEOs have considerable power over the Board of Directors." Although
boards are overwhelmingly populated by independent directors,"
nominal independence is little match for the numerous sources of
influence that CEOs have over board members. 0 CEOs can affect which
incumbents are renominated for election to the board,4 1 and directors will
seek to curry favor with the CEO to retain the substantial compensation,
fringe benefits, and prestige associated with the directorship.42 CEOs can
press for higher director compensation or ply directors with benefits like
asSee BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 201 ("The problems of executive
compensation arrangements . . . are rooted in boards' failure to bargain at arm's length with
executives.").
"Id. at 61 ("The arm's-length contracting model, we have shown, is insufficient to
provide an adequate account of executive compensation.").
"Id. at 66-67.
38CEO power is the basis of both Bebchuk and Fried's critique of the optimal
contracting model of CEO pay, and also the basis of their model, which they call the
managerial power model. Id. at 62.
"See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise ofIndependent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465, 1474-75 (2007)
(noting that in 2005 approximately 75% of board members were independent).
40Bebchuk and Fried note that formal independence is inadequate: "[D]irector
independence has in the past been compromised by CEOs' ability to confer significant rewards
on directors, and . . . recent reforms diminish but do not eliminate their ability to do so."
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 29.
411d at 25-26.
42Id at 25-27. The CEO may be on the board's nominating committee, which selects
new members, and even if not on the committee the CEO may have "decisive influence" over
those who are on it. Id. at 26.
42520 11l]
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travel on corporate aircraft.43 Additionally, CEOs can influence directors
by contracting with them or their businesses to supply the corporation
with goods and services or by directing corporate donations to directors'
favorite charitable causes." The necessarily limited time that directors
devote to board duties also adds to the CEO's power over directors,45 as
does the natural feelings of friendship, loyalty, and collegiality that
develop over time."
Directors face few incentives to resist favoring executives.
Typical directors have minimal company holdings, so they suffer little
financial penalty if the CEO's compensation arrangement does not lead to
optimal results for the corporation.47 In the managerial power model, no
market forces discipline the pay-setting process in any serious way."
Managerial labor markets, the market for corporate control, and capital
and product markets are all inadequate to constrain pay packages;49
market forces are only a very loose limitation on compensation practices,
and the chief constraint on executive pay packages comes from
elsewhere."
In view of managerial power, the operative constraint on directors'
compensation decisions centers not on market forces but on "outrage,"
defined as "negative reactions by outsiders" to compensation practices
viewed "as unjustified or even abusive or egregious."" The particular
outsiders that matter in the managerial power model are those whose
views matter to directors: "the institutional investor community, the
business media, and social and professional groups to which directors
and managers belong."52 Negative reactions from these groups can
impose costs on directors; these are termed "outrage costs."53 As
Bebchuk and Fried explain, "[w]hen the potential outrage costs are large
enough, they will deter the adoption of arrangements that managers
43Id. at 30.
"BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 27-28.
"Id. at 36-37.
"Id. at 31-32.
4Id. at 34-35.
48BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 54 ("[Mlarket forces . .. are unlikely to impose
tight constraints on executive pay.").
49Id. at 54-58.
sod. at 58 (noting that while market forces "may impose some constraints and deter
managers from deviating extremely far from arm's-length contracting arrangements,
overall they permit substantial departures from that benchmark").
Id at 65.
52BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 66.
"Id. at 65.
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would otherwise favor."' Plans deterred in this way have violated the
"outrage constraint.""
Even in situations where "economic incentives provided by the
markets for corporate control and managerial labor would be insufficient
to deter managers from seeking certain outrageous compensation," 6
Bebchuk and Fried note that the "fear of embarrassment or criticism
could discourage managers from doing so."" When deciding what kinds
of executive pay arrangements to adopt, the directors' calculus turns "not
on how costly the arrangements actually are to shareholders, but on how
costly the arrangements are perceived to be by important outsiders."" At
bottom, CEOs are essentially setting their own pay, and only public
outrage constrains what CEOs are able to allocate to themselves.
To address the problems associated with managerial power,
Bebchuk and Fried offer a number of reforms designed to diminish the
power that CEOs have over their board and thus bring pay into closer
alignment with performance. They propose increasing shareholder
power to appoint and replace directors, which would force directors to
attend to shareholders' interests instead of managers' interests." In
particular, shareholders should be able to nominate directors with
comparative ease and have their campaign expenses reimbursed by the
corporation.' Shareholders also should have the power to initiate certain
corporate actions, like reincorporating to a state with more shareholder-
friendly corporate law."
B. Giving Shareholders a Vote on Executive Compensation
The 2010 Dodd-Frank reform legislation gave shareholders an
advisory vote on executive compensation.62 Proponents argue that the
bill was designed, in part, to remedy the problems identified in the
54Id.
55Id
s6BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 66.
57 d.
'Id. at 67.
59 d. at 207 ("The current system-under which the key to a board seat is pleasing the
board members who make nomination decisions-should be replaced. The appointment of
directors should substantially depend-in fact and not only in theory-on shareholders.").
"BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 210-11.
Mid. at 212-13.
62Dodd-Frank § 951 (b)-(c).
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managerial power model: CEOs exploit their power over the board to
increase their pay and decouple it from the company's performance."
Under the implementing rules recently adopted by the SEC, public
companies must include in their proxy materials a separate shareholder
vote to approve the compensation of executives." Shareholders will pass
judgment on the compensation as disclosed in the company's proxy
statements under Item 402 of Regulation S-K, and companies must hold
the vote not less frequently than once every three years." To aid
shareholders in evaluating compensation of the named executive officers,
company proxy materials must also include "a clear description of ...
[any] relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the
financial performance of the issuer.""
The shareholder vote on compensation is purely advisory;
directors are free to ignore it." However, each company must disclose
whether and how it considered the results of the most recent say on pay
vote." Support for shareholder advisory voting is rooted in both major
criticisms of current executive compensation: populist anger over the
absolute level of compensation and a desire to strengthen the link
between executive compensation and firm performance." The political
salience of the sheer magnitude of CEO pay explains a lot of the support
for say on pay." The House Report on the draft bill exudes worry over
63E.g., Steven M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1779, 1818 (2011) ("[S]hareholder activists long have complained
that these [executive compensation] schemes provide pay without performance. This was one
of the corporate governance flaws Dodd-Frank was intended to address, most notably via say-
on-pay.") (citing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5).
"17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011). The say on pay provisions became law as part of
the Dodd-Frank financial overhaul legislation. Dodd-Frank § 951.
65Dodd-Frank § 951.
"Dodd-Frank § 953(a)(i). Companies must also disclose whether executives and
directors are permitted to enter hedging arrangements, which protect them from a fall in the
price of company stock. Dodd-Frank § 955.
67Dodd-Frank § 95 1(c). This section states:
The shareholder vote . . . shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of
directors of an issuer, and may not be construed-{1) as overruling a decision
by such issuer or board of directors; (2) to create or imply any change to the
fiduciary duties of such issuer or board of directors; (3) to create or imply any
additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of directors. ...
Id.
"17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(1)(vii) (2011).
As Jeffrey Gordon notes, the pay for performance criticism of executive
compensation is "fundamentally inconsistent" with the social justice criticism. Gordon, supra
note 10, at 328.
70See Letter from Sen. Carl Levin to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y of SEC (Nov. 18,
2010) (on file with author), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-31-10/s73110-54.pdf
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the absolute size of executive compensation," and politicians of both
parties express strong opinions on the topic. 2 They argue that high
levels of executive pay threaten to tear at the fabric of our society." The
influence of this sentiment appears in the requirement that proxy
materials set forth the ratio of the CEO's annual compensation to the
compensation of the median employee.74 Say on pay, the argument goes,
can give shareholders the opportunity to "restore a sense of balance and
fairness in compensation levels."" Shareholder advisory voting will be
one important way for shareholders to register moral disgust with the
income inequality at publicly-traded firms."6 Widely-noted cases of
shareholder voting on compensation could also amplify the political
salience of executive compensation, which could restrain pay and might
also lead to tax changes targeting high earners. 7
The second source of support for shareholder advisory voting is
from those who believe that say on pay can improve the link between
pay and performance." This rationale for the legislation is grounded
("Excessive executive compensation is an ongoing outrage.").
71H.R. REP. No. 110-88, at 3 (2007) (comparing growth in CEO pay to growth of the
"average rank-and-file worker's pay").
72See Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 3 (remarks of Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-
AL)) (noting a "concern among the American people about the level of executive pay" and a
sense that "the average employee is not being taken care of'); id. at 4 (remarks of Rep. David
Scott (D-GA) (lamenting executives who have "clearly, quite honestly, obscene pay packages
of $2-, or $3-, or $400 million, when the average rank-and-file worker in our system is not
making a sufficient amount of money to actually provide for his day-to-day care").
73Id at 5 (statement of Richard Ferlauto, Director of Pension and Benefit Policy,
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees); see also Jonathan Peterson,
House Votes to Have Shareholders Weigh in on Executive Pay, L. A. TIMES, April 21, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/21/business/fi-execpay21 (quoting Damon Silvers,
associate general counsel of the AFL-CIO: "By every measure, there is increasing discontent
in our country about income inequality generally -- and CEO pay specifically.... I think
passage of this bill is very significant.").
74Dodd-Frank § 953(b)(1).
75Gordon, supra note 10, at 328 (suggesting reasons why people motivated by "social
justice" concerns would support the legislation).
76Anne Sheehan, Give Shareholders Say on Pay, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW BLOG
(June 10, 2009, 3:10PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/hbr/how-to-fix-executive-pay/2009/06/give-
shareholders-say-on-pay.html (noting that "moral outrage [over income inequality] needs to be
acknowledged" and that say on pay can force compensation committees to "demonstrate to
shareholders that they understand the sentiment of the country on this issue and they 'get it"').
77See Gordon, supra note 10, at 329.
78Nell Minow, for example, says "[i]t's when pay and performance are not linked that
we get very upset." Hearing on HR. 1257, supra note 4, at 17 (statement of Nell Minow,
Editor, The Corporate Library). Indeed, the only serious basis for directing the legislation
exclusively at publicly-traded corporations (and not, say, athlete, celebrity, or hedge fund
compensation arrangements) is that the publicly-traded corporation presents a unique situation:
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largely in the managerial power model developed by Bebchuk and
Fried." Giving shareholders a vote on executive compensation, however,
is not among the many reforms that Bebchuk and Fried propose to
diminish CEO power over directors." In their view, the sources of
managerial power over boards are structural, and they do not identify
anything that suggests say on pay would improve that structural
problem."' In recent commentary and Congressional testimony, however,
Bebchuk offers some limited support for say on pay while, at the same
time, emphasizing its limitations." The ability to vote on compensation
plans, he suggests, would "help shareholders influence pay arrangements
and would move pay arrangements toward those that best serve
shareholder interests."" Shareholder advisory voting, in his view, would
be a "useful step[],"84 albeit one that by itself "would do too little to
address the problems of executive pay.""
In spite of Bebchuk and Fried's ambivalence about the
effectiveness of shareholder advisory voting, many of its proponents
expect that it will help ameliorate the disjunction between executive
compensation and firm performance, drawing inspiration, if not support,
corporate executives' pay is perceived as being set in the absence of any market constraints.
While the redistributive impulse may be responsible for most of the political support for say on
pay, this Article generally ignores it and focuses on the pay-performance rationale, which is
the only justification for the legislation defended in the academic literature. Jie Cai & Ralph
Walkling, Shareholders' Say on Pay: Does it Create Value? 46 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS.
299, 309 ("[S]hareholders should not be concerned with the level of executive pay but rather
with the level of pay that is unjustified by performance and the managerial labor market.").
79E.g., Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 1818 ("[S]hareholder activists long have
complained that these [executive compensation] schemes provide pay without performance.
This was one of the corporate governance flaws Dodd-Frank was intended to address, most
notably via say-on-pay."). For their part, Bebchuk and Fried are adamant that their sole
concern is seeing that pay is tied to performance, not the absolute level of pay. BEBCHUK &
FRIED, supra note 5, at 8 ("We would accept compensation at current or even higher levels as
long as such compensation, through its incentive effects, actually serves shareholders.").
8 See id. at 198.
8
'Bebchuk and Fried suggest that executive compensation "is not an area in which
shareholder intervention via voting can completely substitute for the decision making of a
board that effectively guards shareholder interests." Id. They offer only a limited role for
shareholder voting: it "could establish some outer limits to what boards can do without specific
shareholder approval," and directors would still need "to make the many and complex choices
within these outer limits and to negotiate with executives." Id
82See Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 68-69 (statement of Lucian Bebchuk,
Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School).
831d. at 68.
"David Cho & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, House Backs Greater Authority Over Pay by
Shareholders, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2009, at A9.
"sHearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 73 (statement of Lucian Bebchuk, Professor
of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School). Bebchuk's preferred solution would
be more thorough reforms. Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 835.
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from the managerial power model." As one commentator observes,
"Bebchuk and Fried provide much of the intellectual framework for [say
on pay]."" The House Report explicitly relies on their work," and the
legislation is styled as a remedy for the problem of pay without
performance." Thus, the analysis of say on pay here assumes the
correctness of the managerial power model and evaluates the
consequences of say on pay from within that model.
C. The Predicted Effect of Shareholder Advisory Voting
The thinking behind giving shareholders the power to vote on
executive compensation is straightforward: shareholders want the
company to compensate executives in a way that rewards success and
punishes failure. The advisory vote will be an opportunity for
shareholders to register their views, and they will vote against pay
arrangements that are inadequately sensitive to performance. If
shareholders do in fact vote in large proportion against a company's
compensation arrangements, that company will attract a great deal of
attention, none of it welcome. Fabrizio Ferri and David Maber suggest
that "[t]he high responsiveness to say on pay votes may reflect the fact
that, unlike shareholder proposals, a say on pay vote directly questions
directors' choices and, thus, is more likely to generate reputation
concerns-an effective threat."o A "no" vote, in other words, will
animate precisely those forces that act to constrain pay in the managerial
power model to the detriment of directors." They will be anxious to
avoid that result, and the board's desire to reward the CEO thus will be
checked by the shareholders' self-interest.92
86See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 2-3.87Id at 3.
1H.R. REP. No. 110-88, at 3-4 (2007).
89Dodd-Frank § 953(a) (forcing companies to disclose "the relationship between
executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the issuer").
90Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence
from the UK, 6 (March 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1420394.
91See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 70 ("[N]egative publicity-or outrage-
does impose costs.").
92See Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 68 (statement of Lucian Bebchuk,
Professor of Law, Economics and Finance, Harvard Law School) ("I expect that advisory votes
on executive pay would similarly induce boards to give greater weight to shareholder views
and preferences on this subject.").
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The byproduct of that anxiety will be board consultation with
major shareholders." To avoid a "no" vote, directors will informally
canvass shareholders before the vote to ensure that compensation
arrangements are structured in ways acceptable to at least a majority of
them.9 4 One prominent law firm recommends that companies "consider
more vigorous shareholder outreach to assure that potential issues are
surfaced in advance" because "[e]ven though the Say on Pay vote is non-
binding, the consequences of losing such a vote can extend beyond
simply receiving negative publicity."" It is this process that will push
pay and performance into greater alignment." One compensation
consultant likened the potential "no" vote to "a vote of 'no confidence"'. in
the board and the compensation committee, which "would have the
potential to significantly influence the executive pay-setting process.""
Bebchuk predicts that shareholder advisory votes "would discourage
practices and decisions that are strongly opposed by shareholders.""
However, he predicts that the effect would be limited to extreme settings
because institutional investors "would commonly display some deference
to the board's decisions and would cast a 'no' vote only when they see
some good reasons that warrant such a vote."9
93H.R. REP. No. 110-88, at 18 (2007) ("As is the case in other countries, we expect this
tool will improve dialogue between management and shareholders on compensation and make
compensation a more efficient tool for improving/rewarding management performance.").
94See Hearing on HR. 1257, supra note 4, at 68 (statement of Lucian Bebchuk,
Professor of Law, Economics and Finance, Harvard Law School) ("[T]he fact that the outcome
of the vote would be publicly known would apply some pressure on the board to take the
shareholders' preferences into account.").
9 5Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP, Alert Memo: Not Just Financial Reform:
Dodd Frank's Executive Compensation and Governance Requirements for All Public
Companies (July 21, 2010), http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/aldle9da-9375-4938-9863-
elb26lc9a2ea/Presentation/NewsAttachment/alddl6cO-39a4-43b3-9abe-e91f97e8b837/
CGSH%20Alert%2OMemo%20-%2ONot%2OJust%2OFinancial%20Reform.pdf.
9H.R. REP. No. 108-88, at 18 (2007) ("Knowing that they will be subject to some
collective shareholder action will help give boards more pause before approving a questionable
compensation plan.").
9Mark A. Borges, Compensia, Inc. Thoughtful Pay Alert: Shareholder Advisory Votes
on Executive Compensation-A "Say on Pay" Primer, 41st Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation, 1774 PLI/Corp 23, 26 (June 22, 2009).
"Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 68 (statement of Lucian Bebchuk, Professor
of Law, Economics and Finance, Harvard Law School).
991d. at 71.
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III. THE TROUBLE WITH SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY VOTING ON
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
This part explains how mandating shareholder advisory votes can
injure shareholders in a previously unrecognized way. Directors will
wish to mitigate the effect of future negative attention-future outrage-
on their reputation, and so they will have an ex ante incentive to seek
shareholder approval of compensation arrangements. As game theorists
and political scientists note in other contexts, such approval can function
to insulate directors against future outrage by spreading responsibility
across a much larger group of persons, thus diffusing the outrage that
would otherwise be directed at directors exclusively.'" By diminishing
directors' exposure to future outrage, directors may be willing to offer
CEOs pay packages that are less sensitive to performance than they
would be in the baseline scenario of no shareholder approval.
A. Uncertainty and Future Risks to Directors' Reputations
For corporate directors, reputation is extremely important."'
David Skeel notes that corporate directors are "'the most reputationally
sensitive people in the world."" 2 Their standing among "shareholders
and, on occasion, the peers and friends of the firm's managers" matters a
lot to directors."'o As Bebchuk and Fried explain, directors wish to be
viewed with "approval and esteem," and "are likely to prefer to avoid
criticism or ridicule from the social or professional groups whose
opinions they value.""
"ooSee infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
'O'JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 52 (2008). Macey states:
While directors are, of course, intensely concerned about their personal
liability for negligence or malfeasance, this is not their only concern. They
are also concerned about their reputations as leaders and their standing in the
community. In other words, the prevailing norms of director behavior are
stricter and less forgiving than the liability rules by which directors are
evaluated.
Id. See also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J. L. & ECON. 301, 315 (1983).
'o
2David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1812
(2001) (quoting an unpublished interview with Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate Library).
1'1d. at 1827.
1'4 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 66.
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A person's ability to serve as a corporate director-a desirable and
valuable position-depends heavily on an unimpeachable reputation.
Executive compensation decisions carry considerable future risk for
directors' reputations. Of course, almost every business decision
directors make poses some kind of risk; a new debt issuance may box the
company into a financial corner or a merger may fail to live up to its
billing. These kinds of failures generally do not do long-term damage to
directors' professional reputations. In the United States, cultural attitudes
toward business failure are relatively sanguine."o' The risks associated
with executive compensation, however, are different. Poor
compensation decisions carry with them a tinge of corruption, calling
into question the directors' character and probity-not merely their
business judgment-which can be far more destructive to their
professional reputations. On the model that animates the say on pay
reform, the chief risk tor directors who wish to deliver a CEO
compensation package that is large and not sensitive to performance is
that they could be the subject of negative media attention and suffer
consequent reputational harm.
The risk of harm to a director's reputation is different in an
important way compared to the risk of legal liability-the other form of
potential discipline facing directors. Corporations can purchase
insurance policies that can cover directors' legal liabilities, but the threat
of reputational harm cannot be offset with insurance.'o
B. Shareholder Approval as a Means ofProtecting Against Future
Outrage
Proponents of say on pay focus on the consequences that the threat
of a "no" vote poses to boards and how that might force boards to make
CEO pay more sensitive to performance. But they overlook the
countervailing consequences of a "yes" vote. Say on pay offers a
potential avenue for directors to protect themselves-at least in part-
against the risk that future negative attention poses to their reputations.' 7
'
0eMACEY, supra note 101, at 38-39 (noting that "the personal cost of business failure
is relatively low," and that the "importance of the lack of social stigma associated with
business failure cannot be overestimated").
06Skeel, supra note 102, at 1833 ("If a court holds that a manager breached her
fiduciary duties, insurance may cover the financial liability, but it is not much help against a
shaming sanction. A shaming sanction may have serious consequences for a manager's
reputation and firms cannot easily insulate their managers against the threat.").
1o7See Ferri & Maber, supra note 90, at 6.
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Currently, directors receive the entirety of outrage directed at a
company over compensation decisions.'os This focused penalty is what
makes outrage the operative constraint on compensation practices in the
managerial power model.'" Shareholder approval of a compensation
plan, however, can provide some degree of insulation for directors
against future negative attention. Say on pay may allow directors to foist
responsibility for compensation decisions onto shareholders, and thus
outrage will not be directed exclusively at directors but at directors and
shareholders together. As a result, the impact of outrage on directors will
be diminished relative to the baseline scenario with no shareholder
approval. Directors, of course, will not be able to escape all or most
outrage, even if they can divert some of it to shareholders. If the benefits
of securing shareholder approval of executive compensation were
overwhelming, firms would long ago have scrambled to adopt say on pay
voluntarily. They did not, although a non-trivial number of firms
voluntarily adopted shareholder advisory votes on compensation prior to
the passage of Dodd-Frank."o Nevertheless, ratification by shareholders
can have important consequences for directors.
In other corporate contexts, directors may exploit circumstances
that spread responsibility in a way similar to that hypothesized here. As
the size of the board increases, for example, measures of excess CEO
compensation increase."' A larger board means each individual board
member faces a smaller share of the negative reactions by outsiders."'
Further, it may be difficult for outsiders to determine which directors to
hold responsible."' The same phenomenon is at work in the use of
compensation consultants by boards: the use of consultants is associated
with higher measures of excess CEO pay."4 A consultant can provide
08See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 65.
1091d
"oSee infra Part III.D.2.
"'See John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen & David F. Larcker, Corporate
Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON.
371, 372 (1999).
112See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 80-81.
"
31d.
l4Brian D. Cadman, Mary Ellen Carter, & Stephen A. Hillegeist, The Incentives of
Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay, 49 J. ACCOUNTING & ECON. 263 (2010); Kevin
Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and "Independent" Compensation Consultants, 49
J. ACCOUNTING & ECON. 247 (2010); Martin Conyon, Simon Peck, & Graham Sadler,
Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and United
Kingdom, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS. 43 (2009).
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legitimacy for compensation packages and can offer directors a defense
to future charges that they struck a bad deal."' The same sort of logic
applies to bringing shareholders into compensation decisions. While
shareholders cannot be held responsible for initiating the compensation
package, their approval can absorb some portion of future criticism. This
potential consequence of shareholder voting on executive compensation
has gone unnoticed.'16
C. Board Incentives with Diminished Exposure to Future Outrage
Approval by shareholders can at least partially legitimize directors'
compensation choices and allow them to escape a portion of the blame
that would otherwise be theirs alone. Insulated from outsiders' negative
reactions to firm compensation, directors will have diminished incentive
to avoid provoking negative reactions in the first place. In other words,
shareholder assent shields the board from the very outrage that limits
executive compensation, thus attenuating the principal constraint on
executive pay in the model that motivates say on pay.
How directors use this increased autonomy depends on
assumptions about directors' underlying motivations. If directors want to
link pay to performance but refrain from doing so only because the sheer
amount of compensation involved might look bad to the outside world-
the Jensen and Murphy position-say on pay would shield them from the
u5Bebchuk and Fried make use of both findings. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at
81 ("Members of large boards are less likely to be constrained in their decisions by the threat
of public outrage; the larger the board, the harder it is for outside observers to direct their
outrage at any one member."); id. at 70 (noting that use of a compensation consultant allows
directors to avoid scrutiny because doing so "provides legitimacy" and directors later
challenged on pay packages can "justify their compensation decision as being based on the
outside expert's recommendation").
"6The only hint of it came in an exchange between Steven N. Kaplan and Bebchuk at
the 2007 hearing before the House Committee on Financial Services. Kaplan, who testified
against the bill, suggested that some U.S. CEOs at public companies were underpaid. Hearing
on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 15 (statement of Steven N. Kaplan, Neubauer Family Professor
of Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of Business). Bebchuk
observed that believing CEOs are underpaid is a reason to support say on pay. If CEOs were
actually underpaid and shareholders agreed, "companies would be able to raise the
[compensation] packages, and ignore what the media says, because shareholders would vote
for them." Id. at 21 (statement of Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and Alicia
Townsend Friedman, Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Director of Corporate
Governance Program, Harvard Law School). In other words, shareholder approval would
insulate the directors against negative media attention; it would diminish the impact of outrage
on director behavior; and it would diminish at least the outrage from groups besides existing
shareholders, who would still only have one target for outrage-directors.
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complaints of outsiders and permit them to award extremely high-
powered financial incentives."' Under the managerial power model,
however, this is not what motivates directors. That model is based on the
notion that directors on the compensation committee-and on the board
generally-are not, in any practical sense, independent from the CEO."'
The beholden board wishes to reward the CEO and ensure that the CEO's
compensation is not linked to performance. Importantly, because the
formal powers of shareholders are unchanged by say on pay-the votes
would be nonbinding-shareholders will still have the same limited
options for penalizing the board for unfaithfulness."' Therefore, say on
pay will likely slacken the operative constraint on boards' ability to
lavish performance-insensitive pay packages on CEOs without creating
any new formal constraint in its place. As a consequence, boards may be
willing to offer types and levels of pay they might have otherwise been
too hesitant to offer.
This insight into the consequences of say on pay is grounded in a
substantial and growing political science literature that analyzes how the
clarity of politicians' responsibility for policymaking affects voters'
decisions.'20 In democratic elections for political office, voters'
perceptions of incumbents are crucial. For instance, governmental
powers are often divided among various entities and elected leaders, and
voters thus may have difficulty assigning credit or blame to incumbents
for particular outcomes.121 This is known as the "clarity-of-
responsibility" problem.122
Political scientists find that when an incumbent's responsibility
over policy outcomes is clearer, voters are more likely to assign blame
for policy outcomes to that incumbent.12 3  Conversely, the lower the
"
7See Gordon, supra note 10, at 329.
18See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 81-82 (discussing numerous ways a board
could be indebted to a CEO).
"
9Under the Bebchuk and Fried model, allowing shareholders access to the corporate
proxy may diminish some of the CEO's power and thus get at the root of the problem of pay
without performance. See Dodd-Frank § 971; see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at
207.
12oSee, e.g., CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, BLAMING THE GOVERNMENT: CITIZENS AND
THE ECONOMY IN FIVE DIFFERENT EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES 6 (1995).
12'See id (noting that "institutions play a crucial role in structuring the assignment of
responsibility").
122Jide 0. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation
ofPowers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 625 (2010).
123See Christopher J. Anderson, Economic Voting and Political Context: A
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clarity-of-responsibility in government, the more insulation incumbents
have from electoral penalty for policy failures or deviations from voters'
interest. 2 4  In such situations, incumbents are able to "obscure the
weaknesses of their incumbency by blaming them on others who shared
power." 125  An incumbent president of one party will attribute policy
failures to a Congress controlled by the opposing party and vice versa.126
For the same reasons, members of Congress may run against their
colleagues, regardless of who is in power.127 The importance of clarity-
of-responsibility has informed legal debates over topics such as the
structure of executive authority1 28 and federalism.12 9
Politicians actively try to alter lines of responsibility to make them
less clear to voters.130 Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini argue that
Comparative Perspective, 19 ELECTORAL STUD. 151, 161 (2000) (finding in a cross-country
comparison that, "as countries move from clear to obscure responsibility, the economic effects
had less impact" on election results); G. Bingham Powell, Jr. & Guy D. Whitten, A Cross-
National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context, 37 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 391, 398 (1993) ("The greater the perceived unified control of policymaking by the
incumbent government, the more likely is the citizen to assign responsibility for economic and
political outcomes to the incumbents."); Thomas J. Rudolph, Institutional Context and the
Assignment of Political Responsibility, 65 J. POL. 190, 209-10 (2003) (examining state
variation in power allocation of budgetary power between the governor and the legislature and
finding that "[a]s the executive branch's share of institutional power increases, individuals are
more likely to attribute responsibility to the governor and less likely to assign it to actors in the
state legislature," and thus concluding that "individuals' perceptions of political responsibility
[are] sensitive to institutional context").
124See Anderson, supra note 123, at 161 (noting that "countries with low levels of
clarity tended to benefit from institutional ambiguity").
125Powell & Whitten, supra note 123, at 399. Political scientists have long recognized
the incentive for politicians to deflect responsibility onto others to avoid the consequences of
bad decisions. See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 281-82 (2d ed.
1901) ("Each branch of the government is fitted out with a small section of responsibility,
whose limited opportunities afford to the conscience of each many escapes. Every suspected
culprit may shift the responsibility upon his fellows.").
126The dispute between President Clinton and Congressional Republicans over the
1995 government shutdown is an example. See Bob Estill, Op-Ed., Lawmakers are Braced for
Next Round ofBlame Game, ST. J. REG., Nov. 27, 1995, (Editorial), at 5.
127RICHARD F. FENNO JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 167
(1978).
128See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1385, 1426 (2008) (noting the problems associated with institutional changes that
"reduce clarity about which executive is responsible for policy failure, making it harder for
voters to sanction the right official with genuine confidence").
129See MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM 57 (1999) (criticizing "cooperative
federalism" because it "diffuses responsibility"); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy
of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 818 (1998).
13oSee Powell & Whitten, supra note 123, at 399 (noting the electoral advantages for
incumbents that are able to "maintain symbolic visibility but to diffuse political
responsibility"). Politicians also can exploit unclear lines of responsibility for their own
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politicians have an incentive to delegate decisions to bureaucrats when
those decisions are risky because "the bureaucrat acts as a 'scapegoat' for
the politician."' 3 ' This delegation creates a moral hazard because
politicians can insulate themselves from the penalties associated with
opportunistic behavior; consequently, they have greater incentive to
engage in it.
Legal scholars and political scientists have recently drawn on this
insight-that the incentive to cloud responsibility can perversely
encourage malfeasance-in various contexts. For example, in the debate
over the separation of war powers, Jide Nzelibe argues that the president
has an incentive to seek Congressional approval for foreign wars because
doing so diffuses political blame for high-risk armed conflicts.3 2
Presidents desire the political cover and electoral insurance that comes
with approval by Congress,13 3 which minimizes the ability of the
opposing party to exploit the conflict for political gain. Nzelibe
emphasizes the counterintuitive consequences of Congressional
approval; by allowing the president to diffuse responsibility for hostile
engagements, the president may be more inclined to enter high-risk
military conflict.134 In the same vein, Nzelibe and Matthew Stephenson
apply this logic to executive powers generally, arguing that presidents
can seek Congressional approval for various activities as a way of
minimizing the political costs of failure. 35  Justin Fox and Matthew
Stephenson explain the consequences of judicial review in similar
terms.13 6 Judicial review, they argue, "may rescue elected officials from
personal gain, not just electoral benefit. For example, governments tend to have lower levels
of corruption when responsibility is clearer. Margit Tavits, Clarity of Responsibility and
Corruption, 51 AM. J. POL. Sci. 218, 218 (2007) (finding that "governments tend to be less
corrupt in countries where responsibility for government decisions and actions is clearer").
... Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Why Do Politicians Delegate? 17 (Harvard Inst.
of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2079, 2005) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfmt?abstractid=764430.
132Jide Nzelibe, Are Congressionally Authorized Wars Perverse?, 59 STAN. L. REV.
907, 915 (2007).
'
33Id. at 920 ("[C]ongressional authorization for high-risk conflicts will likely serve as
a political insurance policy.").
134Id. at 952 ("[BJy fragmenting the political blame for potentially risky military
engagements between the President and the political opposition congressional authorization
might actually have a perverse effect of unintentionally encouraging the President to engage in
more imprudent wars.").
13!Nzelibe & Stephenson, supra note 122, at 640 ("Although presidents sometimes act
unilaterally, they frequently seek congressional approval, and when they do, the adverse
political fallout from interventions that go bad is lessened.").
136 Justin Fox & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Review and Democratic Failure, 1,
17-20 (Harv. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 09-47, 2009).
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the consequences of ill-advised policies, and this 'bailout effect' tends to
increase democratic failure."13 7
Of course, the differences between politics and corporate
governance overwhelm the similarities, but the core agency problem is
similar enough to allow fruitful comparison of how voting functions as a
means for principals to constrain agents. The implications of the political
science literature for shareholder advisory voting on executive
compensation are clear: in politics, incumbents wish to pursue their own
interests but avoid being voted out of office. In the managerial power
model of executive compensation, directors wish to overpay executives
but avoid facing external outrage."' Just as politicians try to obscure
their responsibility over policy decisions,13 9 corporate directors seek ways
to veil their responsibility for compensation decisions. Using
compensation consultants and expanding the size of boards are examples
of this; shareholder approval of compensation decisions can be another.
In the same way that politicians have greater freedom to pursue their own
interests once they have obscured their responsibility, directors will be
able to offer compensation packages that are higher and less sensitive to
performance if they can obtain shareholder approval.
D. Applications
The analysis here can provide insight into a variety of issues in
executive compensation. Michael Ovitz's compensation package at
Disney, perhaps the most notorious example of executive compensation,
illustrates how directors might find shareholder approval of
compensation decisions useful. The insulation implications of
shareholder advisory voting can explain why a number of firms
voluntarily adopted a say on pay vote well before Dodd-Frank,14 and it
1Id. at 1. Fox and Stephenson note that judicial review only has a net negative effect
on democratic failure if the increase in democratic failure is not outweighed by the correction
of bad decisions through judicial review. Id. at 31.
138Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design
ofExecutive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 786 (2002).
1Powell & Whitten, supra note 123, at 399 ("[O]pportunities to diffuse responsibility
will help insulate incumbents from all the factors that cause them to lose votes").
140See Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1355, 1366 (2010) ("[I]n the last several years (prior to their mandatory imposition as a result
of the Dodd-Frank Act), shareholder activists have put forward proposals that would provide
for, among other things, 'say-on-pay' bylaw provisions.").
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also can explain the findings of empirical studies assessing the United
Kingdom system of say on pay.4 '
1. Disney Co., Michael Ovitz, and Reputational Insulation
Walt Disney's hiring of Michael Ovitz in 1995 provides a concrete
example of how shareholder approval might work to insulate directors
from outrage. That August, Disney hired Hollywood talent agent Ovitz
as the heir to then-CEO Michael Eisner. While there was immediate
public speculation about whether he and Eisner could work together
successfully,'42 industry analysts regarded the hire as a very shrewd and
far-sighted move on Disney's part."' When details of Ovitz's pay
package were disclosed in SEC filings later that year, experts observed
that the amount involved-an estimated $110 million in options-was
large but "not that surprising.'" Other press estimates emphasized that
if Disney continued to grow at its then-current pace, Ovitz's options
could be worth "about three-quarters of a billion dollars."'45 Even in
news reports that drew attention to the severance provisions of Ovitz's
contract, the tenor of the coverage verged on prosaic.'" Compensation
141See Jeremy Ryan Delman, Structuring Say-On-Pay: A Comparative Look at Global
Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
583, 591 (2010) ("[N]early all empirical work dealing with say-on-pay ha[s] been based on the
U.K. experience. ... As the U.S. moves towards adopting its version of say-on-pay, academics
and policymakers have been busy looking at the lessons learned from the U.K. experience.").
142Robert W. Welkos & Judy Brennan, Company Town: Ovitz Joins Disney; Can Two
Top Players Work Together?, L.A.TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at DI ("The question that many in
the entertainment industry were asking Monday was whether two strong-willed leaders can
work together to shape the expanding Disney conglomerate.").
143See, e.g., Adam Pertman, Disney-Ovitz Deal Seen as 'Recreation of Universe,' Bos.
GLOBE, Aug. 16, 1995, at 46 ("No one seemed to think this was merely another good catch
.... Rather, it was 'a brilliant strategic move' or 'a sign of Eisner's genius' or, . . . 'not just the
beginning of a new era but, in Hollywood terms, something approaching the first stage of the
recreation of the universe."'); Harry Berkowitz, It's a No. 2 Coup Disney Hires Talent-Whiz
Ovitz as 2nd-in-Command, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15, 1995, at A3 (quoting Merrill Lynch
entertainment industry analyst Jessica Reif that the hire was a "huge coup" for Disney).
'"Bates, supra note 22 ("[Pay consultant GraefJ Crystal said that the amount is very
large by normal executive standards but not a record, and that it is not that surprising
considering the rich contracts often awarded in the entertainment industry. . . . 'It is an
excessive package by the standards of all the other companies in America, but this is
Hollywood. This is what passes for compensation down in La-La Land."'). Crystal, who
advised Disney on the Ovitz's compensation, was obviously not an unbiased voice.
145E. Scott Reckard, Disney Deal Holds Magic for Ovitz, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Nov.
15, 1995, at Bl.
'"James Bates, Ovitz's Contract with Disney Gets Him a Cool Million, L.A. TIMES,
4412011]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
consultant Graef Crystal, who helped Disney with Ovitz's package, told
the Los Angeles Times: "[b]y Hollywood standards, this is a yawn."'47
At this point, the Disney directors likely could have obtained
shareholder approval for Ovitz's compensation package with little
objection. The package had roughly the same structure as Eisner's
package, which although controversial had not been the subject of a
shareholder mutiny. Indeed, because the hiring of Ovitz was regarded as
a distinct success for Disney, rejecting his pay package would have been
contrary to the shareholders' perceived self-interest. Also, as Crystal
noted at the time, when Disney negotiated Ovitz's pay package it was
forced to consider "'the grim-reaper factor'-the fact that Mr. Eisner had
heart surgery recently and Disney was desperate for a strong No. 2."l'4
Disney could easily have pressed a similar argument to shareholders. It
is hard to imagine that Disney shareholders would have failed to approve
the package.
Ovitz's tenure at Disney was a famous failure.'49 After fifteen
months on the job, he was fired; Disney exercised the no-fault
termination provision in Ovitz's contract, entitling him to a large
severance payment. Although news accounts at the time varied,'so the
actual amount of Ovitz's payout was approximately $130 million."'
Crystal, not long after Ovitz's severance package became known,
questioned: "Can you blame Disney's board for what happened? I don't
think so. They played by the current rules and, consistent with landing
Michael Ovitz, behaved as prudently as they could."'52 Few people
agreed with him. A blizzard of outrage over executive compensation
directed at the Disney board followed Ovitz's firing. One executive
compensation consultant told the Los Angeles Times: "I think it is
outrageous . . . . It was a bad hiring decision by Disney and a very
Dec. 20, 1995, at DI.
147ld
148Hubert B. Herring, Michael Ovitz: The 5 Million Option Man at Walt Disney, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26,1995, at C10.
149See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 714 (Del. Ch. 2005).
'
50See, e.g., Martha Groves & Claudia Eller, Ovitz Severance Leaves Industry Reeling,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at Al ("Ninety million dollars. Enough to buy 2,600 fully
equipped Ford Explorers. Enough for half a million or so business dinners at Morton's.
Enough to put 750 kids through four years at Stanford."); Douglas Feiden, A Big-Bucks Bye-
Bye Disney Ax Worth $125 Mil to Ovitz, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 14, 1996, at A4 ("Michael
Ovitz stands to pocket a whopping $125 million for surrendering the keys to the Magic
Kingdom a record payout for a Hollywood executive.").
.'See Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 57 (Del. 2006) (noting that "the actual payout to Ovitz
was approximately $130 million").
152Graef Crystal, Mike Ovitz Got Away With Murder ... And I Helped Him, SLATE
(Dec. 22. 1996, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2408.
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expensive mistake. They made a high-risk decision, and it ended up
costing them a lot of money.'5 3 Syndicated columnist Robert Samuelson
called the episode "a public-relations calamity." 5 4 He lambasted Disney
for playing with shareholders' money and said executives never would
have been "so cavalier with [their] own cash."'" At the following annual
meeting, various institutional investors withheld votes for five of the
sixteen Disney board members."' The research director of the Council of
Institutional Investors charged that Disney's board "fail[ed] to meet even
basic corporate governance standards."'" One journalist described the
board as "a lot of people with little experience in high finance and who
seemed beholden to Eisner."' The Delaware Supreme Court later
described the board's approval of the Ovitz contract as "far less than what
best practices would have dictated."' In the lower court decision,
Chancellor Chandler noted that "[flor the future, many lessons of what
not to do can be learned from defendants' conduct here."6 o In the
financial media, Lucian Bebchuk described what happened at Disney as
"governance failures."'6'
What might have happened if Disney had secured shareholder
approval of Ovitz's package at its shareholder meeting in early 1996? Of
course, the fallout for the board could not have been avoided entirely.
But surely the board could have deflected some amount of criticism over
its arrangement with Ovitz by emphasizing that shareholders had
approved his compensation. In this alternative history, the board of
directors of Disney could have secured significant protection from
outrage over compensation at little or no up-front cost.
Following the Ovitz fiasco, many boards wondered precisely how
to avoid such a mess in the future.162 A prominent New York executive
'3Groves & Eller, supra note 150.
154Robert J. Samuelson, A Letter to Michael Eisner: How to Fix the Ovitz Problem,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 27, 1996, at A17.
156,d
16Disney Holders Happy About Rise in Stock, Grumpy About Execs' Pay, SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1997, at C4.
1Id.
'ssDavid Lieberman, Disney Tries to Work Magic with New Board Lineup, USA
TODAY, Mar. 19, 2003, at IB.
'"In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 57 (Del. 2006).
'6In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760 (Del. Ch. 2005).
'
6
'Lucian Bebchuk, The Disney Verdict and the Protection of Investors, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2005, at 17.
162See Patrick McGeehan, Quick: What's The Boss Making?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
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compensation lawyer noted that publicity surrounding the Ovitz incident
and others led "directors to say, 'Wait a minute; I don't want to be made a
fool of.""" The New York Times reported that the case made board
members "more inclined to hire a search firm these days almost as an
insurance policy against picking the wrong candidate or as a defense
against critical shareholders."'" One Harvard Business School professor
observed that "[b]oards have realized they are vulnerable."' Directors
can mitigate that vulnerability by seeking shareholder approval of
compensation arrangements.
2. Why Did Boards Voluntarily Adopt Say on Pay Before Dodd-Frank?
A substantial number of companies voluntarily adopted
shareholder advisory votes on compensation-the same kind of votes
Dodd-Frank now requires of all companies. In 2007, the Aflac insurance
company was the first publicly traded American company to voluntarily
adopt say on pay,'" attracting positive attention to the firm.' 7 Other
companies soon followed Aflac's example.' 8 This phenomenon has a
number of potential explanations. Perhaps these boards were not
captured by their CEOs and wanted to signal to the capital markets that
they were attentive to the interests of shareholders.' Another possibility
is that these companies were subject to intense pressure from activist
investors and believed the adoption of say on pay would provide a
reprieve, if only temporary. Or perhaps these boards concluded that say
2003, at Cl.
'"Id. (quoting Joseph E. Bachelder).
'"Laura M. Holson, Investor Suit at Disney Puts Exits in a Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2004, at Cl.
Id; see also Simmons, supra note 7, at 340 (stating that the episode "sent a warning
signal to corporate boardrooms").
166Caudia H. Deutsch, Aflac Investors Get a Say on Executive Pay, A First for a U.S.
Company, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at C3.
WRep. David Scott of the House Financial Services Committee said: "Let us
commend Aflac for stepping up to the plate, and they not only got a hit, they hit a home run,
because they're setting the curve." Hearing on H.R. 125 7, supra note 4, at 5 (statement of Rep.
David Scott (D-GA)); see also, e.g., Allan Sloan, Aflac Looks Smart on Pay, WASH. POST,
May 29, 2007, at Dl.
16A group of companies, including Verizon Communications, Par Pharmaceutical,
Blockbuster and RiskMetrics, and led by pharmaceutical company Pfizer played a prominent
role in supporting say on pay. Claudia H. Deutsch, Say on Pay: A Whisper or a Shout for
Shareholders?, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2008, at B9.
19Warren Buffett, for one, has suggested that reforming CEO pay is a salient way to
demonstrate concern for shareholders. Letter from Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire
Hathaway, to shareholders for FY 2003, 7 (Dec. 31, 2003) ("In judging whether Corporate
America is serious about reforming itself, CEO pay remains the acid test.").
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on pay was likely to be passed,"' and they wanted to try a practice run on
their own terms.
The foregoing analysis suggests a different motivation for boards
to adopt say on pay voluntarily: the insulation benefits which directors
can secure by having shareholders ratify compensation. Boards
voluntarily adopting shareholder advisory votes may have viewed the
modifications necessary for shareholder approval as modest compared to
the diminished outrage in the event that the media directed unwanted
attention onto their executive compensation practices. In Aflac's case,
the company made a very modest change in advance of the first
shareholder advisory vote."' CEO Daniel Amos explained that Aflac's
compensation methodology had not changed for thirteen years, and in
anticipation of the shareholder advisory vote the firm "changed the mix a
bit," by weighting his compensation more toward restricted stock than
options, but "the formula for that top number remains the same.""' In
other words, at Aflac there was no impact on the amount of the CEO's
compensation and merely a small change to the form of compensation.
Shareholders overwhelmingly approved the compensation package at
Aflac; 93 percent of shareholders approved of the package and only 2.5
percent voted against it."' This lopsided approval legitimized the board's
compensation decisions and partially insulates them from negative
scrutiny in the future. Also, by obtaining shareholder approval of its
executive compensation practices in the pre-Dodd-Frank era, a firm
could potentially capitalize on the inertial effects of that earlier
shareholder vote and resist unwelcome new trends that emerge once all
firms are subject to say on pay. Thus, for firms with little to modify,
seeking shareholder approval in advance of the legislative mandate made
sense.
'
7coorges, supra note 97, at 25 (noting that the Obama administration's say on pay
proposal "cements the growing belief that such a vote will be required as soon as the 2010
proxy season"). The timing of these firms' adoption is consistent with this explanation: None
of the firms, for example, adopted their policies before the House of Representatives approved
the say on pay bill for the first time in April 2007.
"'Deutsch, supra note 168.
1721d.
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3. The Say on Pay Experience in the United Kingdom
In 2002, the United Kingdom required companies to hold annual
shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation. Ferri and Maber
studied how the change affected executive compensation there.'74
Shareholder dissent was rare during the first two years of say on pay in
the United Kingdom, but boards swiftly responded to dissent."' Ferri
and Maber found "a marked increase in the sensitivity of CEO pay to
poor performance after the introduction of say on pay.""' They thus
conclude that say on pay was a success in the United Kingdom."
Many see the United Kingdom's experience as encouraging for the
United States."' While the United States's experience could mirror that
in the United Kingdom, there are ample reasons to believe that the
United Kingdom experience may reveal little about how say on pay will
work in the United States. As Jeffrey Gordon notes, "a 'transplant' of
'say on pay' alone would operate differently in the United States,"
because the United Kingdom advisory votes are "bundled with an overall
corporate governance system that gives shareholders considerably more
power than in the United States.""' Crucially, shareholders in the United
Kingdom have much more potent ways of punishing boards for ignoring
shareholder wishes.'o Under United Kingdom law, a shareholder can
call a special meeting, place director candidates on the corporate ballot,
174Ferri & Maber, supra note 90, at 9-10.
'
75All six firms with over 50% dissent in 2003 decreased their levels to below 50% in
2004. The average dissent at those three firms in 2003 was 63.1%; in 2004 it dropped to
19.4%. Id. at 42. To appease shareholders, boards altered provisions associated with "rewards
for failure" (shortening severance payment periods, toughening performance targets in equity
plans, etc.); hired new compensation consultants; and shifted compensation from stock options
to restricted stock. Id at 2 1.
'
761d
178jd
18Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Administration's Regulatory
Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Say-On-Pay (July 16, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/pages/tg219.aspx (noting that in the U.K. "[t]he awareness of a potential
'no' vote and the subsequent change in practices has led to an empirically-verified tightening of
the link between pay and performance"); Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 15 (statement
of Stephen M. Davis, Fellow, Yale School of Management) (noting that the say on pay in the
UK had "one principal effect, and that is that pay is tied much more strictly to performance, to
real performance from the company").
'
79Gordon, supra note 10, at 348.
1sold at 349. (noting that the U.K. has a "legal regime that empowers shareholders to a
much greater extent than in the United States"); see Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 69
(statement of Lucian Bebchuk, Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law
School) ("[S]hareholder rights in the U.S. are weaker than they are in the U.K.").
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amend the articles of incorporation, and remove directors during their
term."' Shareholders generally have none of these powers in the United
States. 82 Further, in the United Kingdom, unlike the United States,
boards may not engage in defensive tactics against a takeover.'" Thus, in
the United Kingdom an expression of shareholder discontent in a say on
pay vote could foretell more serious shareholder action to come; in the
United States, shareholders have no mechanism to reprimand directors
who ignore negative say on pay votes. To Bebchuk, these differences in
power suggest that say on pay is all the more necessary in the United
States.'" However, for the same reasons they also suggest that say on
pay may not be as effective in the United States.
E. Stepping Back from the Managerial Power Model
The argument thus far has assumed the correctness of Bebchuk
and Fried's model of how executive compensation in the United States is
set. The reason for this is straightforward: proponents of shareholder
advisory voting assume the correctness of that model. But what are the
potential effects of say on pay if the managerial power model is wrong
and its critics are correct?'..
If there is no pervasive problem with executive compensation,
what will shareholder advisory voting do? Suppose that the constraint on
pay is not outrage generated by shareholders' anger at the disjunction
between executive compensation and firm performance, but instead
outrage generated by the absolute amount of compensation. If this
account of executive compensation is correct, say on pay could still have
the same consequences of dissipating outrage, irrespective of what
generates it, and it will give boards greater freedom to do more of
whatever they wish. If, as Bebchuk and Fried argue, boards prefer
giving large payouts to executives uncorrelated to firm performance, say
on pay can lead to more of that. If, as Kaplan and others argue, boards
1'8 Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 848-49.
182Id at 844. ("The basic and longstanding principle of U.S. corporate law is that the
power to manage the corporation is conferred on the board of directors.").
'..See id at 849.
1Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 69 (statement of Lucian Bebchuk, Professor
of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School) ("Given how much shareholders'
hands are tied by U.S. rules [compared to the U.K.], providing some means of influencing firm
policy is especially needed.").
'
85See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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would prefer to give more performance-sensitive compensation packages
but are reluctant to do so because of the potential political fallout-the
consequences of which they would otherwise bear themselves-then say
on pay could provide cover for the board and allow it to give larger pay
packages."'
This cover for the Board will present a fundamental challenge in
designing empirical tests of shareholder advisory voting in the United
States. Suppose empirical studies find that the relationship between
executive pay and firm performance tightened at U.S. public companies
following say on pay. This finding by itself will do little to settle debates
about executive compensation in the United States. Say on pay might
force directors to override their natural tendency to favor executives and
act instead in the interests of shareholders, consistent with Bebchuk and
Fried's model. Or it might liberate directors to ignore critics in the media
and act in the interests of shareholders by giving executives higher-
powered incentives. Separating these causes of the tightening of pay and
performance will be a threshold challenge to drawing any broader
conclusions from the experience of say on pay in the United States.
IV. SHAREHOLDERS' INABILITY TO ELIMINATE BAD COMPENSATION
PRACTICES THROUGH VOTING
The insulation effect of shareholder advisory voting applies only if
shareholders approve the proposed compensation. To obtain shareholder
approval, boards may be forced to modify compensation arrangements in
ways shareholders find beneficial. These two consequences of say on
pay are sides of the same coin, one coming only at the expense of the
other. The critical question in weighing which of these effects will
predominate is to what extent boards will be forced to eliminate bad pay
practices in order to secure the "yes" vote from shareholders. If
shareholders can secure modifications to compensation practices with
benefits that outweigh the costs of diffusing directors' responsibility, the
net benefits of the legislation will be positive. However, there are ample
reasons to doubt that shareholder voting will have that strong of an
impact on compensation.
186Bebchuk emphasized this in his testimony to Congress on say on pay. See supra
note 116.
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A. Ex Ante Voting
The say on pay vote will come at a particular stage in the
compensation process: after the firm has settled its pay package with the
CEO but before the CEO has completed-or even started-her
performance under that package. As Andrew Lund argues, voting on
compensation after it has been settled inevitably mixes the vote's
signals-censure of the board's compensation decision or of the
executive's performance.'" Even if shareholders set aside worries about
how their vote will affect the CEO personally,'" it is not obvious that
they, or anyone, can determine what constitutes "good compensation"
before the CEO has completed her term of service. It may be that in
many circumstances compensation can be deemed appropriate (or at least
not outrageous) only ex post. In their book, Bebchuk and Fried focus not
only on components of pay that can be evaluated ex ante, but also on
some that can only be assessed ex post.'" For example, contractual
retirement benefits can be judged ex ante. So too can equity-based
compensation that filters out equity gains independent of the executives'
performance as well as equity packages that prevent executives from
unwinding their exposure.'" But some of their objections to current
compensation practices are based on ex post analysis. Gratuitous awards
made to departing executives, for example, is an issue that cannot be
identified before they happen."' Similarly, compensation components
like sign-on bonuses and executive loans can only be recognized as
problematic after the fact.'"
Most importantly, it is impossible to know ex ante whether a new
executive's performance will be so inadequate relative to her contractual
entitlements that the payout upon her departure from the firm will later
appear outrageous. The question of how shareholders will evaluate pay
'
8 Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay's Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 122 (2011)
("[S]hareholders who are upset with a firm's pay practices may nevertheless accede to
objectionable compensation for fear of offending a CEO they believe to be prospectively
valuable."). For this reason, Lund advocates having shareholders vote on a compensation plan
that the firm will use prospectively. Id. at 161.
'
88Lund suggests that negative say on pay votes may have the collateral consequence
of offending the CEO, and for that reason shareholders fond of the CEO will be reluctant to
vote "no" even if they dislike the board's pay decisions. Id. at 146-47.
'
89BEBCHUK & FIUED, supra note 5, at 166.
sold. at 174-79, 183-185.
Id. at 87.
192Id. at 112, 117.
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arrangements is thus intensely important because it will affect directors'
incentives. Perhaps shareholders will have one eye on the past and one
on the future, but the criteria for evaluating company compensation is
currently unknown and will be of great consequence. Shareholders may
be reluctant to vote against compensation where there is merely the
possibility that payouts to an executive could be outrageous, and this can
inhibit the concessions they insist upon before approving compensation.
B. Nonbinding Voting
The shareholder vote is nonbinding. Boards are legally free to
ignore the results, which limits the influence of the vote.'" To be sure,
an advisory vote by itself can be extremely influential. 94 Cai, Garner,
and Walkling find that executive compensation declines abnormally after
directors on compensation committees receive fewer votes in annual
director elections." But as noted previously, the consequence of a "no"
vote for the board is purely reputational. As important as reputation is,
there will nevertheless be some limit to the concessions shareholders can
demand due to their limited ability to back up their threats.'
C. Stickiness ofPrior Shareholder Approval
Once shareholders approve a firm's compensation, the
opportunities for concessions may have passed. The board has obtained
its insulation benefit and the shareholders their modifications."' But of
course the game will be iterated; companies must hold an advisory vote
periodically, and not less frequently than once every three years.' Will
shareholders be able to undo the insulation effect of a Year-Zero
shareholder ratification by forcing additional modifications in Year One?
Or will the inertia from the Year-Zero approval make shareholders
reluctant to change their votes so long as the underlying compensation
193See, e.g., Cai & Walkling, supra note 78, at 301 ("The Say-on-Pay Bill does not
limit executive compensation but requires a non-binding shareholder vote on it.").
194See id. at 306 (elaborating on some of the possible positive and negative effects of
an advisory vote).
'
95Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Gamer, & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN.
2387, 2389 (2009).
'
96Cai & Walkling, supra note 78, at 334 (noting that the advisory legislation is
"unlikely to affect deeply entrenched managers").
'
97See supra Part III.D.2.
'
98See Dodd-Frank § 951(a)(1).
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package has not changed materially? If influential outrage emerges only
ex post, shareholders may be unable to change their mind on unchanged
compensation without compromising their quality as a signal of
problematic compensation. Shareholders and those who advise them
might be able to make compelling arguments that years of experience
have shown certain, previously-acceptable pay practices to be
problematic and grounds for a no vote. But behavioral research suggests
that shareholders may be reluctant to go against their earlier approval,'
even when they could alter their vote without losing any credibility.
Consider the Ovitz example. The outrage over his pay package
emerged only after he had been fired.200 If Disney shareholders had
approved Ovitz's arrangement in early 1996, it might have been
difficult-though, of course, not impossible-to explain subsequent
shifts in shareholder voting while maintaining that the shareholders are a
credible arbiter of good and bad compensation.20 1 For this reason, there
may be a powerful inertia effect in compensation decisions under say on
pay.
D. Pressure from Modifications or Shareholder Approval at other
Firms
The decisions of shareholders and boards of other companies will
bear on what shareholders and directors at any particular company do. In
other words, some market-clearing package of modifications will arise.
Boards of directors may feel compelled to match those modifications,
and shareholders may be hesitant to press for more. It is not clear at this
point where this will push pay practices under say on pay. Perhaps
public firms will set compensation levels with the help of shareholder
advisory votes, and private and foreign firms will match those prices. It
could also be that the compensation decisions of private and foreign
firms will constrain how far public firms are able to press executives. At
some point shareholders of a firm would be unable to press for more
199See Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD.
OF MGMT. REv. 577, 584 (1981) (arguing that there is a human tendency "to escalate
commitment above and beyond what would be warranted by the 'objective facts' of a situation"
for the sake of mere consistency).
200See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
2 0 See supra Part III.D.1.
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concessions without injuring the standing of the market for executive
talent.202
E. Information Asymmetry
Shareholders face an information disadvantage in voting on the
firm's compensation.20 ' The board will know more about the firm's
competitive position, its willingness to offer alternative compensation
arrangements, and the willingness of the CEO to accept those
alternatives. The board-or the CEO-may also know more about the
future performance of the company and which of the many possible
payouts contemplated by an employment agreement are most likely. To
be sure, there are a variety of ways for shareholders to minimize the
board's information advantage-mandatory disclosure, proxy advisors,
and the media. In spite of them, the board will be able to exploit its
information asymmetry to its benefit.
1. Disclosure
Mandatory disclosure rules are designed to reduce the information
asymmetry between the board and shareholders.2 " In 2006, the SEC
enhanced the executive compensation disclosure requirements for public
companies.205 Designed to increase transparency in compensation,2 the
202See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 6 ("Many public company executives chose to go
work for private equity-funded companies or for private equity firms themselves [during the
2005-07 period]. These were market-based decisions.").
203See Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Emperical Disclosure Literature, 3 1 J.
ACCOUNTING. & ECON. 405, 420 (2001) ("Disclosure studies assume that, even in an efficient
capital market, managers have superior information to outside investors on their firms'
expected future performance.").
204See Simmons, supra note 7, at 343 ("Without question, enhanced disclosure
requirements act as a constraint on managers and improve the monitoring capabilities of
corporate constituents."); Hearing on H.R. 1257, supra note 4, at 9 (statement of Lucian
Bebchuk, Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School) (nothing that
disclosures under new rules "provide a lot of information to the marketplace"); Jeannemarie
O'Brien et al., Drafting and Negotiating Public Company Executive Employment Agreements:
A Practitioner's Guide, 1709 PLI/CoRP 11, 33 (2009) (noting that Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz advise that the new regulations "have resulted in more complete disclosure of
employment agreements," and companies should "make sure that they understand how the
disclosure will appear in the company's proxy statement, and should be mindful of potential
disclosure in crafting new arrangements.").
205Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53158,
53158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229).
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revised regulations require that a company's disclosures provide "one
number for total annual compensation for each named executive officer,"
and a discussion of the company's compensation principles.20 ' In a new
"Compensation Discussion and Analysis" section, the company must
explain the objectives of its compensation program and what the
compensation is designed to reward.208 It must also describe each
element of its compensation program, why it chooses to include each
element, and how it determines the amount or formula to pay for each
element.20 In view of the comprehensive nature of the new rules,
shareholders are in a stronger position relative to the old disclosure
baseline. The additional disclosure requirements that the SEC
promulgates under Dodd-Frank may help even more.2 But of course
they cannot eliminate the asymmetry. 211 Shareholders cannot know, for
example, whether the board could have pressed for alternative pay
arrangements that might have been better for shareholders and also
acceptable to the CEO. The board will be able to continue to exploit the
residual asymmetry in seeking shareholder approval.212
2061d. (noting that the rules intended to provide investors with "a clearer and more
complete picture of the compensation earned by" executive officers).
207Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Votes to Adopt
Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related
Matters (July 26, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm
(quoting John W. White, Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance).
208Id.
20See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006), Instructions to Item 402(a)(3).
21oDodd-Frank § 95 1(b)(1).
2 11See, e.g., Nina Baranchuk et al., Renegotiation-Proof Contracting, Disclosure, and
Incentives for Efficient Investment, 145 J. ECON. THEORY 1805, 1806 (2010) ("[T]he impact of
disclosure is subtle because . . . disclosure about compensation are endogenous and their
information content depends on equilibrium incentives.").
212See David I. Walker, The Manager's Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 657
(2005) ("Managers have an interest in concealing compensation and will respond to new
disclosure requirements by inventing new, opaque compensation elements. Thus, adequate
disclosure will be a continuing race between regulators, on the one hand, and corporate
executives and their compensation consultants, on the other."); see also Hearing on HR. 1257,
supra note 4, at 8 (statement of Lucian Bebchuk, Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance,
Harvard Law School) ("[A]lthough the recent disclosure reform is going to make
compensation more transparent in the future, past efforts by companies to camouflage pay do
raise significant concerns about how companies have been setting pay arrangements.").
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2. Proxy Advisors
Proxy advisors are another potential force for minimizing the
information asymmetry between shareholders and directors.213 Many
institutional investors currently rely on proxy advisors for guidance on
voting for directors, equity plans, and other shareholder issues. Proxy
advisors, however, may have the same difficulties that shareholders have
in evaluating compensation numbers and philosophy ex ante.21 4 To the
extent that proxy advisors evaluate a firm's compensation based on its
governance, there may be strong reasons to doubt proxy advisors' ability
to discriminate between good and bad pay arrangements."' Jeffrey
Gordon predicts that proxy advisors may become especially formulaic in
reviewing compensation,216 leading to "a narrow range of compensation
'best practices' that will be adopted throughout the economy."217 Thus,
while proxy advisors may play a large role in say on pay voting, there is
no reason to think their recommendations will improve the position of
shareholders significantly.
The early returns from the first season of advisory voting on
executive compensation suggests that the influence of proxy advisors
may be limited. The prominent advisory firm ISS recommended negative
votes at 276 companies, and at only 36 of those firms did shareholders
actually vote down executive compensation.218 Indeed, of 2225 firms that
213See Ferri & Maber, supra note 90, at 9-10 (noting various information problems but
suggesting that "information intermediaries (such as proxy advisory services) may reduce
these problems"). Some evidence suggests that proxy advisors have less influence than
commonly thought, in part because shareholders are already paying attention to the
information important to the proxy advisors in formulating their recommendations. Stephen J.
Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Influence of Proxy Advisors
50-51 (NYU L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1127282 (estimating that the marginal
impact of an ISS recommendation to withhold a vote has a 6-9% marginal impact on voting
outcomes).
214See supra Part IV.A.
215See Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the Ratings: How
Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings? 1-6, 45-47 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at
Stanford Univ., Working Paper Series No. 1, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
=1152093 (2010 revision) (finding that proxy advisors do not provide shareholders with useful
information).
216Gordon, supra note 10, at 352.
217Id at 367.
218 Michael R. Littenberg, The Votes Are In-Deconstructing the 2011 Say on Pay
Vote, HARVARD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BLOG (July 29, 2011, 9:09 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/07/29/the-votes-are-in-%E2%80%94-
deconstructing-the-20 11-say-on-pay-vote/.
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held votes through June 17, 2011, shareholders approved the
compensation at 2189 of them, or 98.4%.29 The initial influence of proxy
advisors thus seems much more limited than conventional wisdom had
anticipated.
3. The Media
The media could be a powerful force for helping shareholders to
minimize the natural information advantages of directors. There is a
limited amount of research examining how media coverage influences
executive compensation, 20 and it leads to mixed conclusions. Core,
Guay, and Larcker find that absolute levels of compensation, not any
measure of "excess compensation," drives whether the media focuses on
a firm's compensation. 221 They also find that "excess compensation" is
associated with negative media coverage.222 This somewhat encouraging
result is in tension with their finding that the media is drawn to large
option exercises in its negative coverage, leading them to conclude that
the motivation behind media coverage of executive compensation
"appears to be sensationalism" instead of providing information valuable
to shareholders. 23  The media, in other words, may lead shareholders
astray in identifying problematic pay packages and may not equalize the
information available to shareholders.
4. Strategic Behavior by Boards
While some forces can minimize the informational asymmetry, the
board still has an incentive to aggravate it in other ways. The greater the
anxiety and uncertainty among shareholders about future firm
performance, the more deference shareholders may be willing to show to
the board. Thus, the board might try to take advantage of situations
where shareholders are more apt to defer to the board's inherent
2191d.
220John E. Core, Wayne Guay & David F. Larcker, The Power of the Pen and
Executive Compensation, draft of May 23, 2007, at 1 ("[T]here is little empirical evidence on
the role of the popular and business press as a potential monitor of executive pay . . . .");
Alexander Dyck, Natalya Volchkova & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the
Media: Evidence from Russia, 63 J. FIN. 1093, 1098 (2008).
221Core et al., supra note 220, at 24.
222Id. at 25.
2231d at 29.
2011] 455
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
informational advantage-a health event for a current executive, a recent
change in the company's strategy, or alterations in the competitive
landscape. Consider the Ovitz example. If shareholders worried ex ante
about the Ovitz package, the board could emphasize recent events: that
Disney had just merged with Capital Cities/ABC224 and that Eisner had
recently been hospitalized for a heart bypass procedure.225 If the board
had said to shareholders that Ovitz was necessary to sustain the
company's success and Ovitz said he would accept nothing less than the
pay package on the table, it would be difficult to imagine Disney
shareholders voting against his compensation.
V. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND THE CASE
FOR AN OPT-OUT REGIME
A. Which Firms Can Benefit from Say on Pay
Shareholders will not be able to eliminate bad pay practices
through advisory voting, and thus the net effect of say on pay is unclear.
Suppose firms are arrayed on a spectrum of compensation practices,
from terrible to comparatively great. At firms with bad compensation
practices, shareholders may see net benefits as a result of say on pay
because the modification effect may outweigh the insulation effect.226 At
the other end of the spectrum, shareholders in firms with already good
compensation may see net costs.2 These may be the sorts of firms that
adopted shareholder advisory voting voluntarily before the
Congressional mandate. For those firms, the benefits of reputational
insulation for the firms' directors are likely to be greater than the trivial
expense of obtaining shareholder approval. Compensation at those firms
could suffer as a result.
For firms on neither end of the spectrum, the results are decidedly
unclear. Improved disclosure can provide shareholders with a more
comprehensive picture of compensation practices and a potentially
stronger bargaining position.228 But in view of all of the forces involved
224Adam Pertman, Disney-Ovitz Deal Seen as "Recreation of Universe," BOS. GLOBE,
Aug. 16, 1995, at 46.
225Herring, supra note 148.
2 26Gordon, supra note 10, at 352. ("It is clear that legislated 'say on pay' in the United
States is one way to catch and stop misbehaving outliers . . . .").
227See id. at 325 (providing some of the anticipated costs).
221See id at 346 (implying that shareholder knowledge of compensation contributed to
shareholder empowerment).
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it is difficult to predict how the equilibrium under say on pay would
change relative to the existing baseline.2 ' One certainty is that say on
pay will fail to meet the problem identified by the managerial power
model, in which most publicly-held companies suffer from pay-
performance problems.230
Empirical work suggests that say on pay may have a positive
effect only in a limited subset of firms. Examining market reactions to
the surprisingly lopsided 2007 House approval of an earlier version of
the legislation,"' Cai and Walkling found significant and positive market
reactions to the passage of say on pay-approximately 0.5 percent-for
firms with overpaid executives and executives whose pay is less sensitive
to performance.232 The market reactions Cai and Walkling find come
from an interesting set of firms-firms with bad governance, but not the
worst. On various measures of governance, such as board size,
percentage of outside directors appointed by the CEO, and boards whose
directors hold many directorships, firms in the third quartile-not the
fourth-show the strongest positive market reaction.3 This suggests
that market participants expect say on pay to be most effective in firms
with governance that is bad enough to permit the board to overpay the
CEO, but not so bad that the board can afford to ignore the advisory
vote.234 As Cai and Walkling conclude, say on pay "will create value for
firms with overpaid CEOs and firms more likely to respond to
shareholder votes."235 In other words, for these firms, the modification
costs will outweigh the insulation costs, and forcing these firms to go
through with a shareholder advisory vote (and thus modify their pay
packages) will provide net benefits to shareholders.
229Jeffrey Gordon predicts there will be no dramatic change in compensation: "there
would be no 'big bang' in the United States." Id. at 353.
23BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that "significant deviations from
arm's-length contracting have been common in widely held public companies" and that such
deviations are currently "substantial and widespread").
231Cai & Walkling, supra note 78, at 301 ("The passage of the Say-on-Pay Bill might
not be surprising to the market, since Democrats were in control of the House. However, its
2-1 margin (269 positive votes vs. 134 negative votes) was a surprise, as well as the fact that
55 Republican Congressmen also supported the Bill.").
2321d. at 312, 314. "Overpaid" in this context means compensation that is statistically
high relative to other firms of similar characteristics like size, industry, leverage, and so forth.33Id. at 315-18 and Table 4.
234See id at 318
235Cai & Walkling, supra note 78, at 332.
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At firms where managers are entrenched or pay is not abnormally
high, there is almost no evidence for benefits from the legislation in the
Cai and Walking results. Looking at market reactions by abnormal CEO
pay, firms in all but the highest quartile had statistically insignificant
market reactions to the House vote,236 and the market reaction for firms in
the lowest quartile of abnormal CEO pay was negative.237 Looking at
firm reactions by various measures of corporate governance-board size,
outside holdings, indices like the G-Index and E-Index-firms in the top
two quartiles and in the bottom quartiles experienced non-statistically
significant reactions across all measures of governance.238 These results
were generally positive, but not uniformly so.' In sum, the evidence is
consistent with the analysis in this Article: Only at a discrete set of firms
will the benefits of modifications to executive compensation outweigh
the insulation directors can obtain from shareholders' ratification of pay
packages.
Empirical evidence also suggests that for certain firms the net
effect of say on pay could be negative. Before Dodd-Frank, shareholders
of a public company could sponsor a proposal that the company adopt
say on pay voting. Cai and Walkling examined these shareholder-
sponsored say on pay proposals at 113 firms between 2006 and 2008.240
These proposals received tepid endorsement from shareholders: Average
support for say on pay proposals was less than 30 percent.24 1 The market
reactions to shareholder-sponsored say on pay proposals are similarly
telling: When say on pay proposals were defeated by shareholders, the
average abnormal market return was positive 0.4 percent, and when
proposals were approved by shareholders, the market reaction was
negative 1.9 percent.242 The market reacted favorably when shareholders
rejected say on pay proposals, and negatively when shareholders adopted
them. Cai and Walkling interpret these results to show that "in general
company specific say-on-pay proposals target firms that are unlikely to
benefit from compensation related changes," and that consequently "the
market reaction is negative when proposals targeting these firms receive
Id at Table 3.
237,d
23 1d at Table 4.
239Firms in the lowest quartile of "busy directors" had a CAR of -0.075%. Cai &
Walkling, supra note 78, at Table 4B.
24old at 302-03.
241Id. at 330.
242Id. at 331, and Table 10. The 2.3 percent difference is statistically significant at the
5% level.
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higher levels of support" from shareholders. 243 This suggests that some
firms may see net costs from a say on pay vote.2" Cai and Walking
conclude that those who agitated for shareholder-sponsored say on pay
proposals did "not target the 'right' firms."245 This of course implies that
there are firms for which say on pay is wrong. At these firms, the costs of
insulation may outweigh the possibly trivial benefits shareholders can
obtain through modifications to compensation arrangements. As Cai and
Walkling emphasize, say on pay "does not .. . benefit all firms. "246
B. The Attractiveness ofan Opt-out System
The shortcomings of the legislation as currently drafted grow out
of its overbreadth: it forces all firms-not just those where shareholders
believe say on pay would be beneficial-to hold advisory votes on
compensation. Amending the legislation to allow companies to opt-out
of the say on pay regime by shareholder vote would improve the
legislation considerably. Firms where shareholders expect to see benefits
from advisory voting can continue to hold them, even over the objections
of directors, but firms where shareholders will see no benefits from say
on pay could select to not hold advisory votes.
Others have proposed making say on pay an opt-in regime.247 At
first glance, an opt-in approach is attractive because it would allow
shareholders to adopt advisory voting irrespective of the board's
wishes.248  At the same time, it would not require any firm to hold
shareholder votes.249 At firms where shareholders' benefits from
modifying compensation plans outweigh the costs of insulating directors
against future outrage, shareholders could choose to vote on
compensation.25 In such a regime, shareholders would not initiate say on
pay at firms where they would suffer by insulating directors more than
they would gain from modifying compensation.
243Cai & Walkling, supra note 78, at 331.
244See id. at 334-35.245I. at 327. Only firm size-not abnormal compensation or raw compensation-
explained which firms were targeted by shareholders. Id.
246Cai & Walkling, supra note 78, at 335.
247Jeffrey Gordon argues for an opt-in say on pay regime. Gordon, supra note 10, at
326, 356-60.
248Id at 358.
249See id. at 326.
250See id. at 356.
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The fatal problem with the opt-in system, however, is that boards
would still be free to adopt say on pay on their own initiative. A board
that anticipates insulation benefits greater than the costs of modifications
necessary to obtain shareholder approval would institute shareholder
advisory voting by its action alone, even though shareholders at these
firms would not need the modifications and would not want to give
directors the cover. As more and more boards voluntarily adopted say on
pay-and were thus able to deliver more CEO-friendly pay packages-
other boards would be compelled to follow in order to have the insulation
necessary to deliver competitive CEO pay packages. This adverse
selection problem would push boards to adopt say on pay even if it offers
no benefits to shareholders. On balance, the opt-in approach offers no
substantial benefits over a mandatory system so long as boards retain the
freedom to elect shareholder advisory voting on their own.
The solution is to apply the say on pay requirement to all
companies but allow individual companies to opt-out by shareholder
vote. The amendment to the legislation and regulations would be
straightforward: Currently, companies must hold votes on how
frequently to hold say on pay votes, and shareholders may decide to vote
every 1, 2, or 3 years.25' They must hold these frequency votes at least
every six years. 252 The amendment could simply add the option of no
voting on compensation to the menu in the frequency vote. Thus,
shareholders would vote every six years whether to hold shareholder
advisory votes on compensation every 1, 2, or 3 years or not at all. This
would allow those firms whose shareholders believe say on pay to be
beneficial to protect their ability to vote and extract modifications,
regardless of the wishes of the board. At those firms where shareholders
gain little or nothing from modifications and will suffer from diffusing
responsibility for compensation decisions may opt out. To ensure that a
board does not pass advisory voting against the wishes of shareholders,
the rule should be construed to make the frequency vote the only method
by which a company could put an advisory compensation vote to
shareholders. This approach retains the benefits of say on pay for the
discrete set of firms that can make use of it and allows other firms to
avoid the costs associated with shareholder voting.
21Dodd-Frank § 95 1(a)(2).252id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Shareholder advisory voting on executive compensation can
benefit a discrete set of firms by forcing the board to modify pay
practices in ways they otherwise might not. But the regime also comes
with costs overlooked by commentators. Shareholder approval has the
potential to insulate directors from criticism for compensation decisions,
which may perversely lead directors at some firms to offer pay packages
that are higher and less sensitive to performance than the current
baseline. Once this effect is taken into account, the reform, on balance,
will not necessarily help shareholders at all firms and, in fact, may injure
shareholders at some subset of firms. More generally, shareholder
participation in firm governance can have unintended consequences:
when shareholders share in responsibility for firm decisions, it can be
more difficult to hold directors accountable for the outcomes of those
decisions.
The overbreadth of the say on pay regime could be ameliorated by
allowing firms to opt out of it by shareholder vote. This would preserve
the benefits of shareholder advisory voting on compensation for the set
of firms that can make best use of it and allow other firms to exit the
regime at little cost.
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